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Farm commodity programs have been a major component of U.S.
agricultural policy for more than fifty years.

The federal government

first implemented these programs during the 1930's to help small
farmers maintain their lifestyles.

Supply control measures such as

acreage reduction programs increased farm income by keeping commodity
prices artificially high.

In addition, other policies were designed to

help reduce possible financial risks and losses involved in farming by
guaranteeing a minimum support price.

Although the emergency

conditions of the Great Depression no longer exist, the federal
government has continued to rely upon these orignial commodity programs
to deal with agriculture's basic problem of overproduction.
In the short run, farm commodity programs have been successful in
increasing farm income and prices but have failed to solve the
underlying problem of overproduction.

Ironically, these measures have

operated in the opposit manner, not only stimulating production in the
long run, but also causing production to be less efficient than what it
would be in a free market setting.

Due to resource combinations below

the optimal level, commodities are produced at a higher cost to society
and inefficiencies arise.
In addition to this problem of inefficient use of resources,
agricultural commodity programs have caused some equity and
distributional problems over the years.

For example, due to price

supports and land retirement programs which have increased the prices
of American commodities relative to the world, the level of exports has
been below that which would be found in a free market.

Another problem

resulting from these measures is that the programs have actually
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benefited the large farm operator, rather than the small farmer as
orignally intended by directly tying the amount of benefit to farm size
and output.

Furthermore, the problem of escalating land prices can be

attributed to agricultural commodity programs since benefits from these
programs have been capitalized into land values.

Finally, these

programs have been a growing burden on the federal budget as programs'
costs and cash benefits to farmers have risen.

Nevertheless, the

federal government has continued to implement these measures despite
these negative secondary effects.
The purpose of this paper is to measure the economic
inefficiencies caused by federal acreage reduction programs.

This

measurement of inefficiency found by using an econometric model of the
feed grain sector, will be used to help support the belief that farm
commodity programs which the federal government has continually
sponsored, do not serve as long term solutions to agriculture's
historical problem of overproduction.

Furthermore, it will support the

view that alternative approaches such as returning agriculture to a
more laissez faire, free market structure, would be more efficient and
should replace present policies.
To develp this thesis, the paper will be divided into three
secitons.

Section I will give a description and background information

on the major types of farm commodity programs which have been sponsored
by the federal government.

This will enable the reader to get a better

understanding about farm commodity programs and their effects.

Next,

Section II will examine the most recent acreage reduction program, the
1983 Payment-in-Kind (PIK) program and its effects on farmers as well
as other members of society.

PIK was chosen not only to exemplify the
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impact of supply control measures on the economy, but also to emphasize
that this "new" farm canmodity programs was actually not new, but
merely another acreage reduction program, like those originally
implemented in the 1930's.

Finally, Section III will attempt to

measure the inefficiencies resulting fran the federal government's
acreage reduction programs using an econanetric model applied to the
feed grain sector.

This estimate will be used to show that supply

control programs are not efficient measures, nor do they solve the farm
sector's overproduction problem.

SECTION I

TYPES OF FARM COMMODITY PROGRAMS

Over the years, three basic types of agricultural commodity
programs have been used by the federal government to raise farm prices
and incomes.

As can be seen in Figure 1(a), the first type of farm

program, price supports, uses a price floor to increase commodity
prices. The floor price, P', is greater than the equilibrium price, P,
and therefore, stimulates overproduction.

Quantity increases fran Q to

Q', causing disequilibrium since quantity supplied is greater than
quantity demanded.
The second program type represented in Figure 1(b), increases
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demand to raise farm prices, shown here as a shift from D to D'.

These

demand expansion measures increase not only quantity supplied and
demanded from Q to Q', but also increase commodity price from P to P' •

The third type of program uses production controls to reduce
commodity supply in order to increase prices.

Figure l(c) shows the

effect of these supply-reducing measures as price rises from P to P'
and quantity decreases from Q to Q', due to an upward shift in the
supply curve from S to S'.

PRICE SUPPORTS

Price supports, the first type of commodity program, have been
used to reduce producers' financial risks by guaranteeing a stable,
minimum commodity price through nonrecourse loans.

Originally, this

measure was designed "to increase and then stabilize commodity prices
by setting loan rates above the average weather crop levels at certain
percentages of parity prices." 1 This parity price was defined as the
price that would give the commodity the same buying power in terms of
goods and services bought by farmers that the commodity had in the
1910-14 base period.

This standard has been considered over the years

as the "fair" price that farmers deserve to be paid for their output.
Today, however, this parity price standard has been replaced with a
cost-of-production measure.
Recently, the level of price support has varied from year to year
since prior to each planting season the Secretary of Agriculture
announces a new support price.

Farmers who participate in the program

..
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have the opportunity to obtain nonrecourse loans.

To do so, the farmer

must comply with planting restrictions and store the commodity pledged
for the loan in a government-approved facility which is used as
collateral for a loan at the support level rate.

When the loan comes

due, the farmer generally has three alternatives:

(1) to deliver the

commodity to the CCC as full repayment of the loan, (2) to renew the
loan for another year, or (3) to repay the loan in cash and resume
control over his crop.

The first alternative is chosen only when the

market price falls below the support rate, thereby providing farmers
with a guaranteed base price.

These commodities are then stored and

become part of the CCC-owned reserve stocks.

The other alternatives

are chosen when the market price is above the loan rate and accumulated
interest charges.

Therefore, price supports have allowed farmers to

gain from any price rise without a risk of loss.

DEMAND EXPANSION PROGRAMS

Historically, supply control measures such as acreage reduction
and price supports have been the predominant features of agricultural
commodity programs.

However, programs to increase demand, the second

farm program type, can be found in various farm legislation such as the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 480, 68
Stat. 454; July 10, 1954), the Food Stamp Act (P.L. 525, 78 Stat. 703;
August 31, 1964), and the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C.; 60
Stat. 230; June 4, 1946).

These programs include research of new uses

for farm products, policies to increase

for~ign

demand for U.S.

commodities, and measures to increase domestic demand for surplus
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crops.

Nevertheless, demand expansion measures such as these are not

considered by economists as viable long run solu1tions since they do
not attempt to reduce overproduction.

PRODUCTION CONTROLS

The third program type, supply control, raises price and income by
influencing the amount of land used for production through acreage
reduction programs.

In acreage reduction programs, the federal

government reduces land usage by paying the producer to voluntarily
set-aside or divert to conservation purposes, a certain number of acres
normally used for production.

Payments are made on a per acre basis

and are determined using past yields of the crop that is usually
planted on the retired land.

The rationale behind this "input control"

program is that the less land used for productive purposes will reduce
total supply of the surplus commodity, thereby increasing not only the
commodity price, but also farm income.

Furthermore, by controlling the

maximum number of acres which can be used for production, the federal
government can try to keep supply more in line with demand on an annual
basis, thereby keeping surplus stocks at a minimum.

HISTORICAL

BACKGROUND

2

Present day commodity programs have descended directly from those
farm programs implemented in the 1930's.

Although these commodity

programs have been slightly modified in the past 50 years, structurally
thay have remained very similar to the original programs which were
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designed to alleviate farm problems which peaked during the Great
Depression.

Prior to these programs, farmers had experienced extremely

low prices and incomes but continued to expand production in an attempt
to increase profits.
Immediately upon becoming President in 1929, Herbert Hoover
established the Federal Farm Board in the Agricultural Marketing Act
(P.L. 11, February 10, 1929) of that year in hopes of helping farmers
overcome the depressed conditions which existed in agriculture while
the non-farm sector experienced wealth and abundance.

Using loans,

this board attempted to stabilize prices by controlling surpluses.
Loans to farmer cooperatives were made in three ways:

(l)acquiring

excess supplies, (2)constructing new storage facilities to store
surplus commodities, and (3)making advances to growers for their crops
in order to support prices.

However, due to a limited amount of funds

to work with, the board's finances were soon exhausted without
accomplishing its goals.

After the board was dissolved and the

Depression set in, prices fell substantially causing farmers to demand
federal legislation either to control production or to limit quantities
going to market.
In response to declining net farm income which fell from $6.3
billion to $1.9 billion during the Hoover Administration,

J

the

Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (P.L. 10, May 12, 1933) was
designed to rescue the small farmer from bankruptcy.

It provided

provisions to adjust farm production to meet market demand, thereby
reducing commodity surpluses and increasing farm prices.

The act

created the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) which not only
was authorized to enter into voluntary agreements with farmers who were
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paid to reduce acreage of the basic commodities,

4

but also was

permitted to regulate marketing through voluntary agreements.
Furthermore, the act gave the AAA the authority to levy taxes on
processors of commodities and to use these proceeds to pay for the cost
of expanding markets.

However, in 1936 the production controls and the

processing tax features were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in the Hoosac -Mill decision (U.S. vs. Butler, 297 U.S. 1).
Nevertheless, these features, in addition to others, were incorporated
into the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (7 U.S.C.,52 Stat. 31;
February 16, 1938).

This legislation introduced the idea of

nonrecourse loans to producers under certain market conditions and
offered payments to farmers which would provide a return as close to
parity as the available funds would permit.

In later legislation,

these parity prices were replaced with target prices and these returns
became known as deficiency payments.
The crisis conditions which existed during the Great Depression
for agriculture were relieved with the beginning of World War II.
Demand for U.S. farm products rose, reducing U.S. surpluses and driving
prices to high levels.

Farmers were encouraged to increase production

through such patriotic appeals as "Food will win the war and write the
Peace" ,5 while supply-control mechanisms of earlier legislation were
discontinued.

The Stabilization Act of 1942 (15 U.S.C., 56 Stat. 767;

October 2, 1942) developed from the fear of what would happen to farm
prices once the war ended.

In order to prevent farm prices from

immediately dropping, the act assured farmers that the prices of the
basic commodities would be supported at a fixed 90% level of parity for
two years after the war ended.

However, these fixed price supports
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were extended in the Agricultural Act of 1948 (P.L. 897, 62 Stat. 1247;
July 3, 1948) and 1949 (P.L. 439, 63 Stat. 1051; October 31, 1949),
although the Secretary of Agriculture at that time, Charles F. Brannan,
unsuccessfully submitted to Congress a new farm program.

The purpose

of Brannan's plan was to achieve income equity for farmers by shifting
from the traditional parity price standard used in the price support
programs to an income standard.

It placed a greater emphasis on a free

market structure since supply and demand forces would be allowed to
determine the price of the commodities. Price supports would be
replaced with supplemental payments made by the federal government
based on the difference between the farmer's income in the free market
setting and an acceptable income level determined by the government.
Consumers would be able to purchase food at a cheaper price while all
farmers would be guaranteed a minimum income.

However, this plan would

have substantially increased government cost, which was one of the
reasons that it failed in Congress.
Fixed price supports at high levels could not continue as
surpluses mounted and prices fell.

Once again war, this time the

Korean conflict, proved to be beneficial to the agricultural sector by
strengthening the demand for farm products.

After the war ended,

however, fixed price supports again were continued while a debate grew
as to whether these supports should be fixed or flexible.

Surpluses

were accumulating and immediate action was needed as storage facilities
overflowed.

For example, toward the end of the Korean War in 1952,

CCC-owned stocks of wheat were at a postwar low of 256 million bushels
while only two years later, stocks swelled to 933 million bushels. 6
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, To prevent further overproduction. acreage control measures of the
1930's were re-introduced in legislation passed in 1956.

The Soil Bank

was established in the Agricultural Act of that year (P.L. 540. 70
Stat. 188. May 28. 1956).

This was the first nation-wide effort to

bring production of agricultural products in line with demand.

It was

a large scale. voluntary program aimed at reducing output through both
short- and long-term land retirement.

The act was divided into two

provisions--the Acreage Reserve and the Conservation Reserve.

The

short-term land retirement plan. the Acreage Reserve. was designed to
reduce production of basic commodities by restricting the amount of
land used for their production while meanwhile maintaining

farmers'

incomes. Through formal contracts. participating farmers agreed to take
a certain percentage of their land out of production and to not harvest
any other crop on the land during that year.

In return. the farmer

would receive a land-rental payment at least equal to the net income
the farmer would have earned from the land put into the reserve.

The

other provision established the Conservation Reserve which was a long
term general land retirement program aimed at conserving soil. water.
and wildlife.

Farmers were paid to divert all or a part of their

cropland to soil-conserving uses under long-term contracts of five to
ten years.

Payments were two-fold--an annual per-acre rental payment

and a cost-sharing payment for carrying out the conservation measures.
Because these per-acre rental rates were low. farmers tended to put
only their marginal. less productive land into the reserve.

Meanwhile.

the federal government had paid these land owners for not producing on
land which was unfit for growing crops and which possibly would not
have ,been used for production purposes.

11

Attempts to redirect farm policy occurred during the early part of
the 1960's as output per man-hour and output per acre rose.

Willard

Cochrane, the chief economic advisor for the Secretary of Agriculture
during the Kennedy years, formulated a mandatory supply management plan
which "would be a deliberate restriction of farm supplies with a view
to ra i s i ng f arm pr i ces and i ncomes. ..

7

Mem b ers

0f

t h e agricultural

committees in Congress introduced Cochrane's idea of federal marketing
orders for all surplus commodities in the Cochrane Bill of 1961.

These

marketing orders were to be a government determined maximum amount that
each producer would be allowed to sell.

Although the bill did not

pass, it did bring to the public's attention the idea of mandatory
supply management as a means to reduce surpluses and to raise commodity
prices.

In the early 1970's federal farm policy changed in response to
excess global demand for food due to rising population and low
agricultural production abroad.

To meet expanding demand, the

competitive market system again was allowed to operate in the
agricultural sector with only a few production controls.

Programs were

implemented which reduced many of the government controls and
restrictions,

allowing farmers greater flexibility and more

decision-making power.

The Agriculture Act of 1970 (P.L. 524; 84 Stat.

1358, November 30, 1970) suspended the earlier program measures which
included marketing quotas and acreage allotments for wheat, cotton, and
feed grains.

Instead, the act relaxed planting restrictions by not
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including a limit on acreage of any particular crop.

However, in order

to qualify for the price support program, one supply control provision
did require a reduction in the total acreage devoted to all crops,
called "set-asides".

Program participants were required to set-aside

from crop production a percentage of the national land diversion
requirement computed by the U.S.D.A.

The remaining cropland was then

available for the farmer's chosen use.

This provision gave farmers

more control in decisions affecting their farms and also encouraged
increased production as farmers brought land into production which
formerly had not been used.

Also, exports and prices increased which

further encouraged farmers to buy more land and machinery and to
increase production.
Farm policy drastically changed in 1972 under the leadership of
the new Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz.

During this period all

government-owned storage bins which held surplus stock were sold and
many acreage control restrictions were abolished or substantially
reduced.

Two new concepts, target prices and deficiency payments, were

introduced in the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973
(P.L.86; 87 Stat. 221; August 10, 1973).

Target prices were a minimum

level of prices for specific commodities established by the federal
government and were based on a pre-determined percentage of parity
which was later replaced in 1977 with an average cost-of-production
standard.

Deficiency payments were paid by the government when the

average market price fell below these target prices.

These were the

first steps to a market-oriented, reduced government farm policy.
However, demand eventually decreased and surpluses again mounted,
renewing the need for federal production controls. A number of programs
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were initiated by the federal government between 1977 and 1982 but were
unsuccessful in significantly reducing commodity overproduction.

In

1983 the D.S.D.A. formulated PIK. a type of acreage reduction program.
in response to growing farm surpluses which had be caused by weak
domestic demand. declining exports. and record high 1981 and 1982
harvests.

In the short run. PIK was successful in reducing surplus

stocks and production. but its success was attributed more to the
drought conditions during this growing season than to the actual
program itself.

Although this has been a very brief discussion of farm programs
prior to the 1983 PIK program. the similarities of the programs can be
detected. The basic philosophy that government intervention in the
agricultural sector is needed to adjust commodity supply in order to
maintain acceptable prices still dominates present commodity programs.
Farm legislation first enacted in the 1930's has been extended to the
present with only a few minor modifications.

During this period. farm

policies have focused on restricting the production and supply of
agricultural commodities. thereby raising farm prices and incomes.
However. measures to expand demand have been incorporated in some farm
legislation as a means of reducing commodity surpluses.

Nevertheless.

all of these farm programs have been inherently shortsighted and
unsuccessful in solving the underlying farm problem of overproduction.
As a result of the inability of these programs to encompass the future.
inefficiencies and other secondary problems in the agricultural sector
have surfaced in the long run which will now be discussed in the
following pages.
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14

(l)AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION CONTROLS CAUSE ECONOMIC
INEFFICIENCIES TO ARISE

Although acreage reduction programs and price supports were
designed to reduce production and therefore, supply of surplus
commodities in the long run, the opposite has occurred.

Output has not

been significantly reduced in the long run by these measures, but
instead has caused inefficient resource combinations.

For example,

land retirement programs have been criticized as being ineffective in
reducing overproduction in the long run for they encourage farmers to
intensify production on their unrestricted land.

Although the number

of acres used for production has been reduced by these programs, output
per acre has grown as farmers have increased usage of fertilizer, farm
machinery, hybrid seeds, and insecticides as well as using new
technology and farming practices, such as reduced spacing between rows.
Thus, projected decline in supply due to less cropland used for
production has in the long run, been slightly off-set by increased
yields per acre.

Furthermore, output has not been significantly

reduced in the long run for some land which has been retired or
diverted has been marginally poor and unproductive.

Acres enrolled in

the program have been land which normally would not have been used for
production.

An example of this is the Soil Bank Program which by 1960

had retired approximately 27 million acres.

8

In that year acreage in

crops had declined by nearly the same amount of 25.3 million acres.
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However, the decline in acreage harvested was only 12.1 million acres
which is less than half as much as the 28.7 million acres originally
enrolled in the program.

Although most of the small decline in acreage

harvested can be explained by weather conditions returning to normal
after a period of droughts, it did appear that in certain areas of the
United States, some land that actually was not used for farming was put
into the program.
Over the years, price supports and target prices have also
stimulated

overproduction.

Price supports have reduced farmers' risk

of financial loss since a minimum loan payment is guaranteed which
encourages farmers to produce, rather than to not produce.

Also, price

supports greater than the equilibrium market price have held and
attracted resources to farming, resulting in further accumulation of
surpluses and to inefficient allocation of resources.

Furthermore,

although target prices have allowed a greater market role in
determining prices and output, they also have insured the farmer of a
minimum deficiency payment and further stimulated production beyond
society's needs.
Due to these production controls which require the farmer to
substitute other inputs for land, nonoptimal combination of resources
results.

Inefficiencies arise because the commodity is produced at a

higher cost to society since the farmer is using a combination of
productive resources below his optimal level.

Furthermore, price

supports and target prices for surplus commodities stimulate
overproduction which also distorts resourse allocation.
Figure 2 9 exemplifies the effect of production control programs
and the inefficiencies which arise from them.

In a free market where

FIGURE 2
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government does not intervene with agricultural production, the supply
of feed grain would be the curve denoted by 5.

Given the demand for

these commodities as D, equilibrium would be at point E where quantity
is Q

1

and price is P

1

•

Upon implementation of an acreage reduction

program such as PIK, the supply curve would rotate up to 5' and the new
equilibrium would be at point E'.

Q is the minimum amount of feed

grain that would be produced since farmers will always use a certain
amount of land for production is the quantity and is the amount

the

government figures it must cut back in order to reduce quantity to Q2 .
This is due to the fact that acreage reduction programs reduce
production less than what is anticipated since farmers will increase
productivity per acre and retire their less productive land.

In

addition, a price floor such as federal price supports which are set
above the equilibrium price at P

, can stimulate overproduction.

At

3

this higher price, quantity supplied now increases to Q 3
act.ual quantity demanded is only Q4.

, while

Due to overproduction caused by

price supports and to the misallocation of resources found in acreage
reduction programs, inefficiencies arise.

The inefficiencies can be

represented by the areas A and B in Figure 2.

Area A is the welfare

loss to society due to quantity supplied at a level below what is
desired.

In other words, Q1

is the socially optimal amount demanded

in an unregulated market, but Q 2 is what is ac tually produced.

This

area represents the value of goods and services lost through these
production controls.

Area B is the technical inefficiency due to

higher production costs.

These higher costs are attributed to

inefficient resource combinations caused by the federal land
restrictions.

Together, these two areas represent the inefficiency
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arising from acreage reduction programs which this paper will attempt
to measure.

(2) COMMODITY PROGRAMS HAVE INCREASED THE PRICE OF U.S.
AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS RELATIVE TO THE WORLD

Acreage control measures have sought to reduce output and trim
excess supplies in order to maintain a high price for farmers.
Furthermore, price supports have guaranteed a minimum commodity price
and have led to higher market prices for all farmers.

Consequently,

these programs have resulted in an export price for U.S. commodities
higher than the relative world price. Potential foreign demand for
these products is reduced due to the higher price.
has responded by employing various export subsidies.

The U.S. government
These subsidies

make the price of U.S. commodities comparable to world prices and
therefore, more competitive.

However, policies such as P.L. 480, have

increased international trade barriers since other exporting nations
feel that the U.S. is "dumping" its surplus commodities in
less-developed foreign nations.

In retaliation, other exporting

nations such as England, have enacted trade restrictions on the U.S.

(3) DISTRIBUTION OF FARM PROGRAM BENEFITS ARE INEQUITABLE SINCE
THE LARGEST FARMS GET THE MOST BENEFIT S

-
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Benefits from supply control programs are directly linked to the
size of the farm and the amount of production.

Therefore, the farmer

who is able to produce larger quantities of the commodity is eligible
to receive a higher loan from the price support program or a greater
total deficiency payment since both of these payments are based upon
the number of bushels produced or stored.

Furthermore, acreage

reduction programs favor the larger farmer who is able to set-aside a
larger number of acres, thereby receiving a greater total diversion
payment.

Consequently, a very large fraction of the payments under

these farm programs goes to families with incomes that are relatively
high by most standards.
U.S.D.A. economists have considered a more equitable system of
payments, but a viable alternative has not been found.

For example, a

flat payment would encourage the small producer to stay in farming,
perhaps increasing inefficiency.

Furthermore, a maximum income

restriction on the benefits would penalize those efficient farmers
using economies of scale.

Meanwhile, public concern over the present

distribution of these payments arises since the possibility that money
from low-income, nonfarm households may be being transferred to farm
households with higher incomes.

More alarming is the fact that these

people who are subsidizing the larger, wealthier farmers through their
tax dollars, are also consumers who are paying higher food prices
caused fram the federal farm programs' supply-reducing measures.

(4) LAND PRICES HAVE INCREASED LARGELY DUE TO ACREAGE REDUCTION
PROGRAMS

-

•
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Land values are determined by a number of factors including the
desire to invest in land as a hedge against inflation or merely for an
investment, the need for prestige, and the desire for security which is
associated with owing land.

In addition, one of the major factors is

the return that is expected from the land.
the application of technology but also
and acreage reduction programs.

This depends not only upon

upon government price supports

Benefits from these programs have been

capitalizd into the price of land, causing the value of farm real
estate to rise over the years.

For example, a land buyer will be

willing to pay more for land which is supported by the federal
government through price supports as compared to land used for
production of unsupported crops.

Therefore, the seller of farm land

will obtain a price which reflects not only the value of the land
depending on its productivity, but also on its expected benefits from
price supports.

Consequently, many opponents of these farm programs

argue that people such as hired farm labor and tenant farmers who are
most in need of these benefits accruing to landowners, do not receive
their fair share, therefore supporting their view that a change in
agricultural policies is needed.

(5) FARM PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN A GROWING DRAIN ON THE FEDERAL BUDGET

The cost of agricultural commodity programs has increased over the
years as these programs have been expanded to include more commodities
as well as more farmers.

Cash benefits to farmers have grown because

20

the federal government must offer higher land diversion payments and
price supports in order to induce farmers to remove a sufficient amount
of farm land as well as supply from the market.

In addition,

administration costs as well as storage costs have escalated in recent
years as government-owned reserve stocks have substantially grown.

As

a result, the U.S.D.A. has had in the past few years the third largest
department budget.
$48.3 billion.

10

For example, in 1982 the U.S.D.A. had a budget of
It employed 126,832 people directly and helped

supervise or pay part of the salaries of 24,832 others.

In addition,

the U.S.D.A. was the government's biggest lender with nearly $125
billion in loans outstanding of which $20 billion was directly
attributed to price supports.

Ironically, net farm income is only

about half as much as the total amount the federal government spends on
commodity programs.

In other words, the federal government's

expenditures on programs designed to increase farm income are higher
than the actual net farm income figure.

SECTION II

Federal government officials are aware of these inherent
weaknesses caused by supply control measures.

As mentioned earlier,

alternative plans have been proposed in the past by a few U.S.D.A.
administrators as a way to overcome these inefficiencies.

One meausure

recently enacted was the 1983 Payment-In-Kind (PIK) Program which
introduced a different payment concept to farmers.

11

Although this
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program was advertised as a "new" farm program, it was merely another
type of acreage reduction program.

This shows that once again the

federal government consistently has relied upon these measures as a
means of solving the oversupply problem in agriculture, even though
significant inefficiencies arise.

The following section will examine

this most recent type of acreage reduction program.

THE 1983 PAYMENT-IN-KIND PROGRAM

In January 1983, the U.S.D.A. announced a new supply control
measure, the Payment-in-Kind Program (PIK) , in addition to the current
voluntary acreage reduction and cash paid land diversion program.

As

mentioned earlier, PIK was simply another type of acreage reduction
program but gave farmers greater incentive to participate, thereby
encouraging farmers to further reduce 1983 crop acreage of wheat, corn,
sorghum, upland cotton, and rice.

Need for this action developed from

growing farm surpluses which resulted from a weak domestic and foreign
demand as well as from record high harvests in the previous two years.
Consequently, this stock build-up caused sharply lower commodity
prices, depressed farm income and increased government farm program
expenditures.
The distinctive feature of PIK was its payment-in-kind component.
As payment for reducing planted acreage, the PIK program paid
participating farmers in the actual commodity that would have been
planted on acres enrolled in the program.

Then, the farmer could sell

or privately use on his farm the commodity received as payment.
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Furthermore, PIK not only cut production of surplus crops, but also
reduced accumulated surplus stocks in both the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) held reserves and in farmer-owned reserves (FOR).

12

The PIK program also was designed to achieve the following U.S.D.A.
objectives:
"(I) To minimize direct government outlays in support of
agriculture
(2) To improve conservation practices
(3) To increase farm incomes
(4) To help to ease storage pr oblems"

13

Earlier in 1982, the U.S.D.A. had announced a production control
program for crops to be planted in the following spring.

This Reduced

Acreage Program (RAP) required participating farmers to idle up to 20%
of their acreage base.
conserving uses.

Idled acres were required then to be put into

This meant that a cover crop had to be planted to

protect the land against weeds and soil erosion.

Farmers enrolled in

RAP were to be paid a cash land diversion payment equal to $1.50 per
bushel times their normal yields on the first idled 10% of their
acreage base.

14

The remaining 10% of their acreage base enrolled in

RAP simply qualified the farmer for CCC loans and for deficiency
payments which would be paid if the market price fell below the
pre-announced target price.
The PIK program allowed farmers who were participating in RAP to
idle an additional 30% of their base acreage.

Producers were paid an

established percentage of their farm program yield per acre on the
acres idled as long as they devoted this land to conservation purposes.
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These repayment rates were 95% for wheat, and 80% for corn, sorghum,
rice and cotton.

For example, if a farmer who produced corn had a

normal yield per acre of 100 bushels, his PIK payment would be equal to
80 bushels/acre.

Therefore, a farmer could receive a significant

amount of the commodity that he normally would have planted on the
idled acres, which then could be sold in the open market.
Another alternative available to farmers under the PIK program was
the whole-base retirement.

This allowed the farmer to idle 100% of his

base acreage, thereby not producing crops on any of his land.
Participation in this option was determined on a bid basis whereby
producers indicated the payback rate necessary to induce them to idle
all of their crop base.

Farmers could not submit a bid which was

higher than the federal payback rate for the commodity which would have
been planted on their land.

In addition, participation in the

whole-base retirement was limited since no more than 45% of a county's
acreage base for each of the PIK crops could be idled.
The PIK payments to participating growers were made through two
different methods: (1) forgiveness of a loan under the farmer-owned
reserve (FOR) or the nonrecouse loan program, or (2) receipt of an
entitlement to eee-owned commodities.

In the first alternative, the

eee was allowed to liquidate its grain stocks by the amount forgiven by
FOR and nonrecourse loans held by the participating producers in order
to meet their PIK payments.
actually exchange hands.

In this case, no commodities would

The second payment alternative allowed those

farmers who did not hold FOR or reserve loans, or who did not have
enough of a commodity under loan to meet their PIK compensation, to
receive eee stock through a eee commodity certificate.

This did result

..
24

in an actual physical movement of grain as well as a transfer of
ownership.

The recipient farmer then had the option to sell the

commodity immediately or to store the crop and sell it at a future
date.

To promote orderly marketing so that not all of the PIK stock

would be dumped on the market at the same time, the

eee

agreed to pay

up to five months' storage expenses on PIK commodities received by the
participating producer.

Although PIK used a slightly different payment approach, it was
still an acreage reduction program since farm income and commodity
prices were increased by restricting the amount of land used for
production.

However, PIK did provide greater benefits and

participation incentives for farmers as compared to earlier supply
control programs.

In addition to these standard production control

measures which assure farmers a higher price than that found in a free
market setting, the PIK program also guaranteed farmers a percentage of
their normal yields.

Therefore, the risk of financial loss was reduced

by PIK since both high prices and yields were pledged by the federal
government.

In years where weather adversely affects production, such

as the recent 1983 growing season, farmers would be much better off
under a PIK program than under a regular acreage reduction program
since the yield per acre guaranteed under PIK probably would be higher
than the actual yield affected by the weather.

Therefore, the farmer

enrolled in PIK would benefit from receiving a yield greater than the
average yield for the season affected by the poor weather.
Additionally, the PIK farmer would receive a greater total payment
since these guaranteed yields could then be sold at a higher market
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price resulting from both the supply-reducing measures and the adverse
weather.
Another incentive to enroll in the 1983 PIK program was the dollar
amount of benefits which a farmer was eligible to receive.

Under

earlier programs, a payment limitation of $50,000 was in effect for all
farmers agreeing to reduce acreage.

However, to provide additional

incentives to idle cropland by participating in PIK, Congress abolished
this payment limitation.

Therefore, the farmer enrolled in PIK could

receive a total cash benefit greater than that received from a regular
acreage reduction program.
Furthermore, enrollment in the PIK was enhanced by the greater
expected increase in farm income resulting from reduced production
costs.

Variable costs of production would be lower for those farmers

participating in PIK since money spent on inputs such as fertilizer,
farm machinery, pesticides, seed and farm machinery repairs would be
lower due to the smaller number of acres used for production.

As can

be seen in Appendix I, this allowed PIK farmers to obtain a higher
total net farm income as compared to the alternative Reduced Acreage
Program (RAP).

As a result, farm equity for PIK participants could

rise as farm income grew.

Therefore, farmers who enrolled in PIK would

have better ability to improve their financial position by reducing
outstanding farm debt.

THE OUTCOME

15

The 1983 Payment-in-Kind Program was the largest acreage reduction
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program ever sponsored by the federal government.

Approximately 80

million acres were taken out of production due to PIK.

In addition,

the drought conditions experienced by the agricultural sector reduced
productivity per acre which further added to PIK's success.

As a

result, the economic effects of the PIK program were distorted by the
weather's influence on crop production.

However, in order to obtain

estimates reflecting PIK under normal weather conditions, the U.S.D.A.
used regression models based on historical data to adjust actual
figures.

Therefore, PIK statistics used in this study are not actual

figures, but merely estimates of PIK.
Overall, PIK did reduce production as well as stocks.

For

example, corn production was reduced by 1,260 million bushels and
ending stocks of corn declined by 83%.

In addition, PIK improved

conservation practices since approximately 77 million acres· were put
into conserving uses, resulting in a projected 20% decline in soil
erosion.

Finally, net farm income increased by $4 billion between

1982-83, largely due to reduced production costs, improved commodity
prices and increased government transfers resulting from the program.
Hence, some of the U.S.D.A.'s objectives of PIK mentioned earlier were
successfully realized.
Although the U.S.D.A. declared PIK a success since it reduced both
production and surplus commodity stocks as well as increased farm
prices and incomes, the price of success was high.

The total

administrative cost of the program alone was estimated to be $55.3
million.

16

Most of this can be attributed to the increased workload of

the A.S.C.S. county offices which were responsible for administrating
the program.

These increased activities included such things as
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explaining the program's provisions to farmers and farm organizations,
accepting and reviewing contracts fram the 100% PIK option, and
overseeing participating farmers to make sure they were complying with
the conservation stipulations.

In addition, the

system for delivering PIK commodities from
warehouses close to PIK recipients.

eee

eee

had to develop a

storage facilities to

Due to the size of the program,

this was an extremely difficult and time consuming task.

Distribution

was further complicated by the imbalance in government stocks.
Warehouses to the west of the Mississippi River were filled with PIK
commodities while most of the payments were going to farmers to the
east of the river.

For example, Nebraska had 140 million bushels of

PIK corn more than it needed while Ohio was short by more than 45
million bushels.

17

As a result, same farmers were paid in a

lower-grade commodity or were forced to travel two or three counties
away to receive their PIK payments.
One of the most significant consequences resulting from PIK was
its adverse effects on many agricultural input industries due not only
to the size of the program, but also to the reduced acreage
requirements.

For example, the demand for fertilizer, the most

severely affected input, declined by nearly 18%. Furthermore, both
energy usage and farm machinery repairs were projected to decline 12%,
while the demand for seed was expected to fall 13%.

Overall, the

actual total expenditures for these inputs dropped by an estimated $5.2
billion.

However, input expenditures are expected to rise

significantly in the 1984 growing season since input usage should
increase due to fewer acres taken out of production.
The non-farm sector was also affected by PIK through higher food
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prices.

The U.S.D.A. has predicted this increase to be only 1% , a

very modest estimate.

Realistically, this appears to be a low

prediction since one of the basic food groups affected by PIK is meat.
Higher feed grain prices resulting from PIK will cause livestock
producers to reduce their livestock numbers in order to avoid higher
production expenses.

As a result, the supply of meat in the short run

will be high as livestock owners reduce herds by sending more hogs and
cattle to slaughterhouses.

However, in the long run this supply will

be low since the base for future production has been reduced in the
short run.

Higher meat prices and therefore, increased food prices can

be expected in the two to three year period following the PIK program.

SECTION III

As has been emphasized, PIK was a type of acreage reduction
program which had greater incentives to participate as compared to
other acreage reduction programs.

Like earlier programs, PIK payments

were the largest for those producers who were capable of producing
more, thus inequity did arise.

In addition, the government cost of the

program which at first was projected to be extremely low, proved to be
one of the highest cost commodity programs sponsored by the U.S.D.A.
Finally, PIK like earlier acreage reduction programs caused
inefficiencies to arise since resources were not combined in a manner
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optimal to society.

It is these inefficiencies which this paper will

now attempt to measure.

METHOD TO MEASURE INEFFICIENCIES

As noted earlier, the inefficiencies resulting from acreage
reduction programs consists of two types:

1) welfare loss to society

and 2) technical inefficiency, which together are represented by
triangle E'ZE in Figure 3.

In order to measure this total area of

inefficiency, a demand curve and two supply curves, one representing
free market supply where government production controls do not exist
and the other reflecting supply affected by acreage reduction programs,
must be determined.
inefficiencies.
be measured by

These curves will form two areas of

Welfare loss to society, shown by triangle E'FE, can
~omputing

the area of the triangle.

This can be found

by simply substituting points computed by the regression model into the
formula for the area of a triangle.

The resulting equation

representing the inefficiency due to welfare loss to society can be
written as follows:

(1) Area A

1/2 (E'F)(Q'Q)

In order to find technical inefficiency represented by triangle
E'ZF, the point where the two long run supply curves intersect, point Z
in Figure 3, will be found by setting the two long run supply curve

•
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equations equal to each other.

This point of intersection can then be

used to measure the area of triangle E'ZF by subtracting triangle FZT
from triangle EZT:

(2) Area B

1/2 (qQ')(P'P) - 1/2 (QQ')(PP

f

)

Total inefficiency caused by acreage reduction programs will therefore.
be equal to the sum of the two areas.

THE REGRESSION MODEL

Equations for the supply and demand curves were found using an
econometric model which causally related agricultural inputs.
production. price. supply and demand.
applied only to the feed grain sector.

The model used in this study was
This sector was specifically

chosen because feed grains historically have been a major component of
the federal government's surplus stocks and have been one of the basic
commodities targeted by acreage reduction programs.

Although feed

grains used for both consumer and livestock consumption consist of
corn, barley, sorghum and oats, they are defined in this model as only
corn and sorghum since the federal government has focused on reducing
the excess production of these two commodities.

Therefore, feed grains

as used in this study will include price and quantity data for· only
corn and sorghum.

The data were taken from various Agricultural

Statistics printed annually by the Department of Agriculture.

In

addition, some figures were taken from statistical charts and tables
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directly available from the U.S.D.A. and the Agricultural Stabilization
and Conservation Service (A.S.C.S.).

Observations were made annually

from 1965 to 1983 with most of the 1983 numbers being figures projected
by the U.S.D.A.

The initial year, 1965, was chosen not only due to the

availability of data, but also to the growing influence the federal
government has had on agricultural production since this base year.
Using this data, the demand and supply equations needed to measure the
two areas of inefficiency were then determined using ordinary least
squares (OLS).

(A) INPUT EQUATIONS
In order to determine the needed supply curves, input equations
were estimated for selected inputs used in the production of feed
grain.

These inputs were chosen not only due to their importance in

feed grain production, but also because of the impact acreage reduction
programs have had on these factors of production.

Others which should

be included in this model but were not due to inavai1abi1ity of data
are fuel and energy inputs, machinery repairs, and pesticides.
One of the most essential inputs used in feed grain production is
land.

In this model this factor of production is used to determine not

only the demand for the other inputs but also to compute current
production.

where AC
LAGP

The equation for this input is as follows:

harvested acreage of feed grain

= lagged

price of feed grain
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Suppose it takes two years for the supply response in the
feed grain sector to be completed. In periods of low prices such
as Pi and P , the resulting inunediate quantities are ~ and~. However,
2
these low prices will not be fully reflected until two years later at Q3.
This smaller quantity (Q1) results in a higher price, P3 , whose effect
will not be seen until two years later at Q5. This will: continue until a
long run equilibrium is reached at point E.
In this regression (Equation 2) a drop in quantity in the current year
could be represented in this figure as P increasing to P while quantity falls
4
3
from Q to %.
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LAGPS

lagged price of soybeans

ACDIV

feed grain acreage diverted to conservation uses

LAGAC

lagged harvested acreage of feed grain

PSUPP

price support for corn and sorghum

Last year's price of feed grain, LAGP, will help determine the amount
of acres producers decide to devote to feed grain production.
According to the Cobweb Theorem , farmers' decisions on the amount of
production will depend upon last year's price.

For example, if last

year's price was high, farmers will tend to increase production in the
current year.

Similar to this is the federal price support for feed

grains for if the current price support is high, farmers producing on
land which can easily grow corn as well as some other crop, would plant
corn since they are guaranteed a higher price.

In addition, since

soybeans are considered by most farmers as a substitute crop for corn,
it can be expected that farmers would devote more acres to feed grain
when the price of soybeans is low.

Fertilizer has become an important input used in farming and has
been the
the years.

factor most responsible for increasing yields per acre over
The following equation will attempt to determine the demand

for fertilizer:

where F

commercial fertilizer

AC = harvested acreage of feed grain
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PF

= price

of commercial fertilizer

LAGF

lagged quantity of fertilizer

LAGP

lagged price of feed grain

PSUPP = price support for corn and sorghum

Acreage of feed grain (AC) was used in this equation as well as in the
remaining input equations and was determined fram the previous
regression equation. (Equation 1)

It is included since the amount of

cropland devoted to feed grain would directly influence the amount of
fertilizer demanded by the producer.

That is, if acreage of feed grain

is reduced due to the federal acreage reduction programs, the desired
quantity of fertilizer will decline.

This decline will be only a

fraction since farmers will increase usage of fertilizer on their
remaining acres in order to increase productivity.

In addition, the

previous year's price of feed grains as well as their price support are
included in all the input equations.

This is due to the direct

relationship between the previous year's price and current price
supports and the selected inputs.

For example, if last year's price or

this year's price support of feed grain is high, farmers will want to
increase current production by (1) increasing the number of acres
planted, (2) increasing the use of fertilizer on the land used for
production or (3) increasing both the number of acres planted and
fertilizer usage. The previous year's quantity of fertilizer is
included in the equation to reflect farmers' expectations. For example,
if the quantity of fertilizer demanded was low in the previous year,
producers will want more fertilizer in the current year to make up for
the fertilizer not used on the land in prior years.
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Like fertilizer, farm machinery has played an increasingly
important role in the history of U.S. agriculture.

Automation and

mechanization have caused the agricultural sector to be more dependent
upon horsepower, fuel, and size.

Farm machinery usage is responsible

for reducing both hours and work involved in agriculture, adding to the
increase in farm productivity.

These relationships are represented by

the following equation:

where FM

farm machinery

AC = harvest acreage of feed grain
PFM
y

price of farm machinery
total net farm incane

FMST

farm

LAGP

lagged price of feed grain

~achinery

stock

INI' = interest rate

PSUPP

price support for corn and sorghum

Theoretically, farm machinery is directly related to total net farm
income since the quantity of farm machinery demanded tends to increase
in periods of high net farm income.

Likewise, interest rates are

included in the equation since the financing of such capital
expenditures usually involves sane type of a loan.

The relationship

between these two variables is expected to be negative for as interest
rates rise, the number of loans will fall, and therefore, the amount of
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farm machinery demanded by producers will decline. Furthermore.
included in the equation is the stock of farm machinery which is found
by the identity:
(4) FMST

where FMST
LAGFST
PM

t

= LAGFST

+ FM

t

farm machinery stock

= lagged
=

farm machinery stock

farm machinery

The final input equation used in this model is the equation for
hired farm labor.

Over the years farm machinery has steadily replaced

this input. adding to its decline.

Likewise. acreage reduction

programs have been accused by farm labor unions of accelerating this
decline of labor in agriculture.

where

The proposed equation for labor is:

L = hired farm labor
W

AC

hourly wage
harvested acreage of feed grain

FMS = farm machinery stocks
LAGP
PSUPP

lagged price of feed grain
price support for corn and sorghum

Wage as well as farm machinery stock is indirectly related to hired
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farm labor.

It is expected that as the wage or stock of farm machinery

rises, less labor will be demanded.

(B)PRODUCTION AND SHORT RUN SUPPLY EQUATIONS
Since output is dependent upon its factors of production, the
production function for the feed grain sector proposed in this model is
determined by these input equations.

This production function can be

represented as follows:

where PROD
F

FM
L

production of feed grain
commercial fertilizer
farm machinery
hired farm labor

AC = harvested acreage of feed grain

A log-linear equation such as the Cobb-Douglas production function
might be a better equation to use, since the expected production curve
should have diminishing marginal products, therefore reflecting
increasing returns to scale.

However, in order to ease computations

later, a regular straight line relationship will be assumed.
This equation which represents current production of feed grain is
a part of the total supply of feed grain.
following equation:

This can be seen in the

-
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(7) SUPPLY:

where

Q

PROD
STOCKS
IMP

Qt = PROD t + STOCKS t + IMP t

total quantity of feed grain supplied
production of feed grain
surplus stocks of feed grain
feed grain imports

In this equation, Q is the short run total supply and will be a
perfectly inelastic supply curve (i.e. a vertical line).

(C) DEMAND

EQUATION

Another essential equation needed in order to measure
inefficiencies arising from acreage reduction programs is the demand
equation.

In theory, consumers' and livestock producers' demand for

feed grain should determine the demand curve.

This equation can be

written as follows:

(8)

DEMAND:

where P

PSUPP

price of feed grain
= federal price support for corn and sorghum

Q = quantity of feed grain

LAGur
YD

:=

lagged utilization of feed grain

= consumer disposable income
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LVST

livestock production

By shifting terms, demand can also be represented by the equation for
price :

(9)

The price support for corn and sorghum will affect the price of feed
grain directly since a high price support will more than likely cause
the market price to be high.

Likewise, a large livestock production

level and a high feed grain utilization in the previous year will
increase the demand for feed grains, thereby raising feed grain prices.
On the other hand, a large total quantity of feed grain will draw feed
grain prices down since supply exceeds demand.

(D) DETERMINING LONG RUN SUPPLY
The total supply curve of Equation 7 is the short run total supply
curve. Therefore, in order to measure the two areas of inefficiency,
long run supply curves will need to be determined.
To compute long run total supply curves for both
government-influenced and free market settings, it must be realized
that an equation for the price of feed grain can be found in terms of
last year's price of feed grain plus other predetermined exogenous
variables.

This is because input equations are all interrelated by

..
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harvested acreage of feed grain (AC) in Equation (1).

After making

needed substitutions, this equation can be represented as follows:

where P

price of feed grain

LAGP

x

lagged price of feed grain
= exogenous variable

An increase in any exogenous variable, say ~

multiplier effect on P.

, will have a

For example, in the first time period, an

increase in Xl

will cause P

increase in P

will cause P _ also to increase in the next time period
t l

t

which in turn, causes P

t

t

to increase by k

2

•

However, this

to increase by an additional

~

.~.

This

process will continue and a multiplier of k2(1/1-kl) can be computed.

Using the adaptive expectation approach
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to obtain a long run

total supply curve, equation 10 can be divided by (l-kl).

Next, LAGP

can be dropped, resulting in the following equation:

where PLR

is the long run price and is a function of all the exogenous

variables in the model.
This estimated long run price can then be substituted into
Equation 9.
supply.

Solving for Q will give the long run quantity for total

Changing the value of one of the variables used in this demand

.
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equation will result in another long run equilibrium price and
quantity.

The long run total supply curve can then be computed by

finding a slope using these figures.
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THE RESULTS

The regression equations to be used in this model to help measure
the inefficiencies caused by acreage reduction programs have been
proposed.

However, in most cases after running these regressions, the

equations actually used are modified versions of these original
equations as can be seen in Appendix I. This paper now will discuss the
results of the regression equations used in this model and determine
the area of inefficiency caused by acreage reduction programs.

A. INPUT EQUATIONS
The estimated equation for harvested acreage as initially proposed
was as follows:

(1) ACt

(1.359)
= 87446.99 - 4.957 LAGP

-

(1.564)
(1.402)
4.483 PSUPP + .358 LAGAC

-

(.161)
378.27 LAGPS

.~54 ACDIV

(5.305)
The absolute t-values are given in parentheses which shows that
only ACDIV is significant at both the .05 and .10 level even though the
independent variables explained approximately 83% of the dependent
variable.

It is interesting to note that the coefficient for ACDIV is

less than one, supporting the earlier proposition that not all land
diverted in acreage reduction programs is actually used for productive
purposes.

In order to obtain a better estimate for harvested acreage,

however, last year's price of soybeans was dropped from the equation
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which resulted the following:

(2.255)

(2) AC

t

= 88586.21 = 5.5386

LAGP

(2.120)
4.751 PSUPP

+

(1.563)
.339 LAGAC
-2
R

(6.402)
.643 ACDIV

= .8468

By dropping LAGPS, two additional variables, LAGP and PSUPP, became

-2

significant at the .05 level in addition to increasing R.

However,

although significant, the LAGP coefficient is negative, differing from
earlier stated expectations.

According to this equation, a dollar

increase in last year's price of feed grain will cause harvested
acreage to decrease by 5.386 million acres.

This result contradicts

with the Cobweb Theorem which the inclusion of LAGP in the equation was
based upon, since the increase in last year's price decreases, rather
than increases, harvested acreage.

Other regressions tried, however,

yielded similar results.
A possible explanation of this negative coefficient could be the
variable itself.

Perhaps the delayed response needed for the Cobweb

Theorem to hold is greater than one year, say two or three years.
Therefore, the coefficient for the first lagged price variable may be
negative, meaning that harvested acreage decreases with an increase in
the previous year's price, but rises when the longer lagged price
increases.
4
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This long run equilibrium "zoning in" can be seen in Figure

where an increase in feed grain price lagged two years actually

increases current harvested feed grain acreage, while the one year
lagged price causes a decrease.

Although this maya plausible

explanation, it must be noted that the negative coefficient for LAGP
also could be due to the model's small number of observations as well
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as to inaccurate data.

In addition, price of feed grain was

unintentionally expressed in current rather than constant dollars.
Therefore, incorrect coefficient signs could be caused by the presence
of inflation in the model.

Despite this imperfection, Equation 2 was

used in the model as the estimate for harvested acreage.

The equation for fertilizer as originally proposed was estimated
as follows:

(.117)
(.029)
(1.130)
(1.632)
.077 PSUPP - .006 LAGF - .563 LAGP + 62.74 PF

(4.8)
(3)F

t

=

-196.37 + .173

AC

-2
R

=

.6464

According to this equation, AC is the only significant variable and has
a positive effect on fertilizer as is expected.

However, a few

unsupported inconsistencies did result from the regression which are
reflected in coefficient signs for PSUPP, LAGP, and PF contrary to what
was expected.

For example, Equation 3 states that a one dollar

increase in the price of fertilizer, other things constant, would cause
the demand for fertilizer to increase by 62.736 thousand tons.
Clearly, this contradicts one of the basic economic theories which

.

states that there exists a negative relationship between price and
quantity oemanded.

Due to these theoretical disagreements and also to

the insignificance of these variables, the regression was ran without
these three variables which resulted:
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(5.573)

(.851)

(4) F = 9682.083 + .130 AC + .307 psupp
t

"R2 = .6345

Although the [2 is slightly smaller, the coefficients appear to be
theoretically correct since an increase in acreage or the level of
price support would be expected to cause an increase in the demand for
fertilizer.

Therefore, despite the loss of three variables from the

originally proposed equation, Equation 4 was used in the model as the
estimate of the demand for fertilizer.

The earlier suggested equation for the demand for farm machinery
was estimated as follows:

(5) FM

t

=

5132.42

+

(1.062)
( .139)
.021 AC + .08 psUPP

-.319 LAGP - 87.275 FMST
(1.212)
(1.016)

+

(.766)
(.351)
.03 LAGY + 15.71 INT

.024 PFM
(.328)
"R2

=0

Like Equation 3, theoretical contradictions did result, in this case
for the variables LAGY, INT, LAGP and PFM.

For example, according to

this equation, if the current interest rate increases while other
variables remain constant, the demand for farm machinery will increase
by 15.706 units. This contradicts with the negative relationship
between investment and interest rate as stated in general economic
theory.

Three possible explanations for this inconsistency are (1) a

wrong interest rate was used in this model, (2) the assumed financing
relationship between interest rate and farm machinery does not exist,

..
45

and/or (3) data used were inaccurate.

The interest rate used in this

model was the prime lending rate, a relatively short run rate.

Perhaps

an intermediate or longer term interest rate would have yielded better
results.

In addition, farm machinery was believed to be financed

through bank loans when the actual financing could perhaps be better
accounted for through some other method such as monthly payments to the
farm implement store.

Finally, farm machinery defined in this model

was composed of those machines which could be directly traced to only
feed grain production (i.e. grain combines and corn pickers).
Therefore, tractors and other motor vehicles, a very large part of farm
machinery, were excluded from the model which may be a possible reason
for the weak equation.
Another variable which is inconsistent is LAGY, the total net farm
income from the previous year.

According to Equation 5, other things

constant, a one dollar increase in last year's total net farm income
would decrease the demand for farm machinery by .03 units.

However,

demand theory states that an increase income will increase the demand
for the product.

Again, this can be attributed to insufficient and/or

inaccurate data.

A more plausible equation for farm machinery was found using the
two most significant variables in the earlier proposed equation which
were harvested acreage and the previous year price of feed grain:

(6) FM t

= -1538.098

+

(.419)
.004 AC
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In this equation, both the explanatory variables are insignificant at
the .05 or .10 level, therefore resulting in a low coefficient of
determination.

Also, LAGP is negative which contradicts earlier

expectations that an increase in the previous year's price of feed
grain, other variables constant, will increase the demand for farm
machinery in the following year since farmers will want to increase
production.

Although this contradiction exists, it was the best

estimate which could be obtained given the data.

The final input equation used in the model was for hired farm
labor which as originally proposed was:

(1 •.548)
(7) L

t

=

-3606.045 - 42.717
+ 1.906 psupp

(.526)

w+ .013

(.401)

(.985)

AC + 39.267 FMST + .558 LAGP

(1.644)

Despite the insignificance of all the variables, the coefficient signs
for the explanatory variables are correct according to earlier
expectations, except for FMST.

According to economic theory, an

increase in capital should decrease labor.

Instead, in this equation,

it increases labor by approximately 39 laborers for everyone million
dollar stock increase. One possible explanation for the insignificant
variables found in this equation besides

possible data problems, is

the fact that hired farm labor in the feed grain sector is not as an
important factor of production as that found in the citrus as well as
in other sectors of agriculture since feed grain production is
extremely capital intensive.

Another possibility is that since labor
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used in the feed grain sector consists more of non-wage, family workers
as compared to hired labor

22

,a

better equation might be obtained by

using data for total family workers.

If this was the case, wage would

not be included in the equation since family labor is not considered
hired labor.
Other regressions were run leaving the most insignificant
variables out of the equation.

These attempts did not yield a better

equation since none of the variables were found to be significant. In
fact, some regressions which were tried, changed coefficient signs
which could not be fully explained.

Therefore, because a better

equation could not be found, Equation 7 was used in the model as the
estimate for labor.

B. PRODUCTION EQUATION
These input equations were used to find production which was
estimated using the following equation:

( .543)

(8) PROD

t

=

(.774)

1201.784 - .533 FM + .048 AC

(.110)
(.232)
.081 L + .096 F

Because none of the explanatory variables are significant, the
coefficient of determination is zero.

Furthermore, both PM and L are

negative which means that according to this equation, these inputs
cause a decrease in production rather than an increase as was expected.
Again, these inconsistencies can possibly be explained by inaccurate
data as well as an insufficient number of observations.

In addition,
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some of the variables may be incorrectly used.

For example, FMST

instead of FM could give a better estimate since the farm machinery
stock will also be used in feed grain production.

Another possibility

is the fact that other inputs such as seed, fuel and pesticides were
not included in the equation. Perhaps by including these inputs, a
better equation could be obtained.

Finally, as mentioned earlier, a

log-linear approach used to estimate production would probably result
in a better equation since production usually resembles a curve more
than a straight line.

However, even though these imperfections did

arise from this equation, it was still used in the model as an estimate
for production.

c.

DEMAND EQUATION

Demand was determined using the price of feed grains as the
dependent variable :

(.494)

(9) Pt

= -7550.32 - .25

(.677)
.013 LVST

PSUPP +

Although this equation had a high R

2

+

(1.941)
.383 LAGUT

, PSUPP was negative.

(1.313) (2.24)
.172 Q + 1.610 YD

According

to the earlier discussion on the secondary effects of supply control
measures using price supports, the price of feed grain should increase
as the level of price support rises.

However, Equation 9 states that a

$1 increase in price supports will cause the feed grain price to fall
by $.25, a very unlikely amount.
A better equation was obtained by dropping PSUPP as well LVST,

..
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resulting in the following:

(10) P

t

= -5058.562

+

(1.676)
.298 LAGUT

-

(3.679)
(3.304)
.274 Q + 1.803 YO

In this equation, all the explanatory variables are significant at the
.10 level.

Furthermore, the coefficient signs for all the variables

correctly correspond to economic theory.

This equation represents

short run price which can be used to eventually find the long run
equilium price as shown in Figure 5.

D. DETERMINING LONG RUN SUPPLY
In order to obtain Equation 10 in terms of all the exogenous
variables so that the long run supply curves can be found, this
procedure was followed:
(1) the equation for harvested acreage was substituted into each
of the other input equations;
(2) these expanded input equations were substituted in the
production equation;
(3) this newly formed production function was substituted into
the demand equation.
This expanded equation for feed grain price can be expressed as
follows:

FIGURE 5

PRICE

QUANTITY
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= -5239.44

- .1599 LAGP + .0922 PSUPP - .00414 LAGAC + .00785 ACDIV
-.94804 W+ .87132 LAGFST - .274 STOCKS - .274 IMP + .298 LAGUT
+1.803 YD

The relationship between the important variables, PSUPP, ACDIV, LAGP,
and P are all positive which what was expected according to economic
theory.

Using the adaptive expectation model, this equation was divided by
1.1599 and LAGP was dropped, yielding the following:

= -4517.148 + .0795 PSUPP - .00357 LAGAC + .00677 ACDIV

-.8173 W+ .751 LAGFST - .2362 STOCKS - .2362 IMP
+ .2569 LAGUT + 1.5.54 YD

Equation 12 is the estimate for the long run price.

By substituting

price obtained in this equation into the demand equation and solving
for Q, a long run quantity corresponding to this price was determined,
therefore giving one point on the long run supply curve.

However, two

points are needed to find the slope and the resulting equation of a
line.
To find a second point on the long run supply curve, demand was
shifted by increasing the value of YD used in Equation 12.

Both long

run price and quantity were found in the same manner as the first point
was determined.

Connecting these two points then yielded the long run

supply curve which is graphically shown in Figure 6.

The free market supply curve was found following exactly the same

TABLE I

YD = $4016
Price

($7bUY

YD = $4050

~uantity

Mil.

bu.)

Price

~uantity

($75UY

Mil.

bu.)

Real World

2.85

4657.2)

2.90

4698.65

Free Market

2.75

5022.19

2.79

5100.11

S'
S

FIGURE 6

PRICE OF
FEED GRAIN

$2.85
$2.75

D (YD t = $4016)

QUANTITY OF
FEED GRAIN
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procedure as that for the supply influenc'ed by production controls
except the value for both ACnIV and PSUPP was zero since these policy
provisions would not exist in a free market setting.
The results from these two procedures, using the mean values
obtained from the given data for the exogenous variables, are seen in
Table 1.

The relationship between these two supply curves as well as

the inefficiencies of acreage reduction programs are shown in Figure 7.

E. MEASURING INEFFICIENCIES
The purpose of this research paper was to measure the two areas of
inefficiency caused by the implementation of federal acreage reductions
programs. Now that equations for both supply and demand of feed grain
have been determined, the procedure to compute the two areas of
inefficiency described earlier will be followed.
The welfare loss to society, represented by triangle E'FE in
Figure 8, was found using the equation for the area of a triangle.
Using the point-slope formula, P

was found to be $2.57.

Inefficiency represented by Area A was determined as follows:

Area A

1/2 (E'F)(Q'Q)
1/2 (.28)(364.9577)
$51.094 million

To find the technical inefficiency

represen~ed

by triangle E'ZT in

Figure 9, the point where the two supply curves intersect (point Z) was
found by setting the two supply equations equal to each other. Price at
point Z was found to be $1.54 while quantity is 3569.1928 million

FIGURE 7

PRICE )F
FEED GRAIN

s

p'

Q' Q

QUANTITY OF
FEED GRAIN

FIGURE 8

PRICE OF
FEED GRAIN

s

p'

p

Q

Q'
QUANTITY OF
FEED GRAIN
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bushels.

Subtracting the smaller triangle, FZT, from the larger

triangle, E'ZT, resulted the measurement for technical inefficiency.
This was determined as follows:

Area E' ZF= Area E' ZT - Area FZT
1/2 (QQ')(P'P) - 1/2 (QQ')(P'P )

= 1/2

(1088.04)(1.31) - 1/2 (1088.04)(1.03)

= $712.664

- $560.339

$152.325 million

Using these numbers as the welfare loss to society and technical
inefficiency estimates, total inefficiencies caused by acreage
reduction programs was found by simply adding the two smaller
components as follows:

Total Inefficiency

= Area A + Area B

= $51.094

+ $152.325

$203.419 million

CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper was to measure the inefficiencies caused
by federal acreage reduction programs and to use this measurement to
support the view that free market policies would be more efficient.
Using an econometric model applied to the feed grain sector, a
measurement of inefficiency was found.

However, the validity of this
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estimate is questioned due to problems with some of the regression
equations used in the model.

Because the reliability of this

measurement is not known, the inefficiency estimate does not support
the free market positon as much as was anticipated.
Three regressions used in the model were not good equations for
the dependent variable since none of the explanatory variables were
significant and some of the coefficients had signs contradicting
economic theory.

These three weak equations existed for the variables

FM, L, and PROD.

Data problems are the most likely reasons for these

weak equations.

Because not all data were specifically for the feed

grain sector, some inaccuracies could have developed.

In addition,

some variables such as INT and L, had more than one set of data
depending on the way the variable was defined in the model.
Insignificant variables could result if the wrong definition and
therefore, the wrong data for the variable was used.

This could also

be caused by failing to deflate all variables in the model as in the
case for price of feed grain.

Furthermore, some variables which should

have been included in a few of the equations were left out due to
insufficient data.

These equations may have been stronger if data were

found so that these variables could be included in the regression.
Finally, the number of observations used in this model may have been
inadequate, therefore, not allowing the true relationship between the
variables to be found.
Although the model was flawed by these three weak equations, a
measurement of inefficiency still was able to be computed.

It was

found in this model that technical inefficiency caused by commodities
being produced at a cost to society higher than that found in a free
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market, was approximately three times greater than the welfare loss to
society.

However, this relationship between these two inefficiencies

can not be considered a reliable one due to the model's inclusion of
the weak input equations for farm machinery and hired farm labor, which
both affect the supply curves' slope.

Given set demand and free market

supply curves, technical inefficiency will be greater than welfare loss
to society as the slope of the real world supply curve falls, thereby
becoming flatter.

This relationship is shown in Figure 10.

Therefore,

since the slopes of the supply curves are questionable due to the
shortcomings of the FM and L

equations, the relationship between the

two inefficiencies can not be considered true.
Likewise, due to the errors found within the model, the total
inefficiency measurement can not be considered a reliable estimate of
the true inefficiency resulting from acreage reduction programs.

It

was found that from 1965-1983, total inefficiency caused by these
supply control measures created inefficiencies equal to approximately
$203 million.

This is a very low and therefore, unrealistic estimate

considering the size of acreage reduction programs and the feed grain
sector during this time period. Clearly, this measurement of
inefficiency caused by government production controls applied to the
feed grain sector does not strongly support the free market position of
abolishing acreage reduction programs.

However, this measurement and

therefore, this paper, does prove that inefficiencies, although small,
do arise from acreage reduction programs implemented by the federal
government.

•

APPENDIX I

To show how much greater PIK's cash benefits were compared to other
acreage reduction programs, a hypothical situation will be considered.
Suppose a farmer with a corn acreage of 1,000 acres is trying to decide
whether to enroll in just the Reduced Acreage Program (RAP) or in both RAP
and PIK. His farm program yield is 120 bushels per acre and the paid land
diversion payment is $1.50 a bushel. If the target price for corn is
$2.86/bu. and the market price per bushel is $3.10, the following comparison
can be made:
RAP
Acreage base (ac)
Farm program yield (bu/ac)
% of acreage base diverted

1,000
120
20%

Paid land diversion payment
(100 ac x $1.50 x 120 bu/ac)

$ 18,000

Production of remaining acres
(800 ac x $3.00 x 120 bu/ac)

$288,000

Total Gross Income
Less: Production expenses
(800 ac x $1.75 x 120 bu/ac)

$306,000
(168,000)

Net Farm Income

$138,000

10-30% PIK
Acreage base (ac)
Farm program yield (bu/ac)
% of acreage base diverted

1,000
120
50%

Paid land diversion payment
(100 ac x $1.50 x 120 bu/ac)
Additional 30% diverted
(300 ac x .80 x 120 bu/ac)
Production on remaining acres
(500 ac x .80 x 120 bu/ac)
Total Gross Income
Less: Production expenses
(500 ac x $1.75 x 120 bu/ac)

Net Fann Income

$ 18,000
89,280
186.000
283,280
(105,000)

$178,280

II

100% PIK
Acreage base (ac)
Farm program yield (bu/ac)
% of acreage base diverted

1,000
120
100%

Paid land diversion payment
(100 ac x $1.50 x 120 bu/ac)
Additional 80% diverted
(800 ac. x .80 x 120 bulac x $3.10)
Total GrosslNet farm Income

$ 18,000
238,000
$256,080

Therefore, assuming the maximum whole-bid of 80%, the 100% PIK option would
provide the most cash benefits.

ENDNOTES

(1) Geoffrey S. Shepperd, Farm Policy: New Directions
State University Press, 1964), p. 9.

(Ames:

Iowa

(2) This section is based upon material taken from American Farm
Policy, 1948-1973 (University of Minnesota Press, 1976) by Willard
COchrane and Mary E. Ryan and Foundations of Farm Policy (University of
Nebraska Press, 1970) by Luther Tweeten.
(3) Don Paarlberg, Farm and Food Policy--Issues of thje 1980's
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1980), p. 20.
(4) Originally, the basic commodities were defined as cotton, wheat,
corn, rice, tobacco, hogs, and milk.
(5) Roy Ewell, Floyd Corty and Gene Sullivan, Economics--App1ications
to Agriculture and Agribusiness (The Interstate Printers & Publishers,
Inc., 1975), p. 16.
(6) Cochrane, p. 32.
(7) Hendrik S. Houthakker, Economic Policy for the Farm Sector
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, November 1967), p. 25.
(8) The following numbers are taken from Shepperd, p. 9.
(9) With the help of Dr. Robert Leekley, this figure was based upon
work done by Luther Tweeten in "Agricultural Policy: A Review of
Leglislation, Programs, and Policy," Food and Agricultural Policy
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1977), p. 104.
(10) The following numbers are taken from Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, "U.S.
Farm Programs come Under Attack as Their Cost Soars," The Wall Street
Journal, November 10, 1983, p. 1.
(11) The ideal of PIK was not new as it was a payment option used in
thje Feed Grain Act of 1961. However, what was new, was the size of
PIK payments and the extensive crop coverage of the program.
(12) FOR is a program in which farmers may hold wheat or feed grains
off thje market for three or more years and have their commodities
financed by loans from the CCC. Storage payments are made to these
farmers by the CCC. In addition, FOR loans carry a higher loan rate
than CCC nonrecourse loans and are applicable for a longer period of
time.

•

(13) United States Department of Agriculture, Initial Assessment of PIK
(Washington, D.C., April 1983), p. 6.
(14) Acreage base is determined from historical planting practices and
is used to compute the allowable planting and acreage diversion acres.
(15) The following numbers which are not specifically footnoted are
taken from Operational Aspects and Market Effects of the 1983
Payment-in-Kind Program (Washington, D.C., February 1984), p. 5.
(unpublished material)
(16) Some expenses include the following:
new form printing and distribution
travel cost and training

$6.5 million
2.7 million

(17) Meg Cox and Betsy Morris, "Distribution of PIK Causing Big
Headaches for U.S. and Farmers," The Wall Street Journal. October 14,
1983, p. 31.
(18) The following figures were taken from Operational Aspects and
Market Effects of the 1983 Payment-in-Kind Program, p. 58.
(19) See Mordecai Ezekiel, "The Cobweb Theorem," The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, February 1938, p. 250-275.
(20) Damodar Gujarati. Basic Econometrics (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1978). p. 265.
(21) This figure was taken from Ezekiel, Figure 4, p. 267.
(22) See Table 575, Aaricultural Statistics 1983, p. 400.
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